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External ﬁnancingWe investigate whether tax avoidance substitutes for external ﬁnancing. We
exploit interstate banking deregulation as a quasi-external shock to examine
whether ﬁrms engage in less tax avoidance after banking deregulation, because
of cheaper and easier access to credit from banks. We ﬁnd no empirical evi-
dence to support this substitutive relation, even for ﬁrms with higher ﬁnancial
constraints or ﬁrms with higher external ﬁnancing dependence.
 2016 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
This study examines the substitutive relation between corporate tax avoidance and ﬁrms’ use of debt. Cor-
porate tax avoidance activities can increase a ﬁrm’s tax savings, and consequently decrease its reliance on
external funding such as debt. The substitution between debt tax shields and non-debt tax shields is modeled
theoretically (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). However, empirical evidence on this issue is very mixed. Using a
sample of 44 tax shelter ﬁrms, Graham and Tucker (2006) ﬁnd empirical evidence that is consistent with the
substitutive relation between these two. However, Edwards et al. (2013) ﬁnd that only ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial
constraints exhibit a higher level of tax avoidance. Further, Bradley et al. (1984) ﬁnd that non-debt tax shields
and leverage are positively related, casting doubt on the existence of a signiﬁcant avoidance-debt-substitution
eﬀect.
A major challenge in determining the empirical relation between tax avoidance and the use of debt is that
both are endogenous in nature (Graham and Tucker, 2006). We alleviate this concern by exploiting the stag-
gered interstate banking deregulation events in the United States. The Interstate Banking and Branching Eﬃ-
ciency Act (IBBEA) was passed in 1994 and became eﬀective as of 1 June 1997. As described by Rice and
Strahan (2010), during this period, states were allowed to erect up to four barriers to protect their local bank-unting
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because of increased banking competition, ﬁrms have cheaper bank loans and easier access to credit (e.g., Rice
and Strahan, 2010; Amore et al., 2013).1 Therefore, interstate bank deregulation provides an ideal quasi-
experiment to examine the substitutive relation between the use of credit and corporate tax avoidance.
Following Rice and Strahan (2010) and Cornaggia et al. (2015), we use RSindex to capture the degree of
deregulation in diﬀerent states and at diﬀerent times. RSindex ranges from 0 to 4, indicating how many bar-
riers the state erected after interstate banking deregulation. Firms in states that are open to competition (e.g.,
RSindex value is 0) have easier and cheaper access to bank loans than ﬁrms in less open states (e.g., RSindex
value is 4).
We construct tests using staggered interstate banking deregulation events as exogenous shocks to the credit
supply and the cost of bank loans. If the substitutive relation between cash savings from tax avoidance and
external ﬁnancing holds, we expect to observe a decrease in ﬁrms’ tax avoidance practices after interstate
deregulation when they have easier and cheaper access to external ﬁnancing (i.e., bank loans). Therefore,
we expect RSindex to be positively associated with tax avoidance.
Given that we are interested in broad tax avoidance strategies that could reduce the ﬁrm’s explicit taxes,
following Dyreng et al. (2010), Hope et al. (2013) and Hasan et al. (2014), among others, we use the eﬀective
tax rate (GAAP ETR), cash eﬀective tax rate (Cash ETR), discretionary book-tax diﬀerence (Discretionary BT,
as in Desai and Dharmapala (2006)) and discretionary permanent book-tax diﬀerence (DTAX, as in Frank
et al. (2009)), as our measures of tax avoidance.
In our baseline model, we collect all available observations around interstate deregulation events (pooled
sample) and control for standard determinants of tax avoidance. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on RSindex are
not statistically signiﬁcant for all four measures of tax avoidance. Therefore, our results do not provide sup-
portive evidence for the substitutive relation between tax avoidance practices and external ﬁnancing. We fur-
ther constrain our sample to diﬀerent event windows and ﬁnd similar results.
According to Edwards et al. (2013), ﬁrms with higher ﬁnancial constraints are more likely to exploit cash
savings from tax avoidance practices. To examine whether the substitutive relation holds for ﬁrms with higher
ﬁnancial constraints, we divide our sample into two subgroups based on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraint levels and
perform the baseline model using these subsamples.2 We ﬁnd that interstate banking deregulation has no sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on corporate tax avoidance even for ﬁrms that are facing higher ﬁnancial constraints.
We further examine whether the extent to which companies depend on external ﬁnance aﬀects the substi-
tutive relation between tax avoidance and external ﬁnancing. We assume that ﬁrms with higher dependence on
external ﬁnance are more likely to be aﬀected by interstate banking deregulation. The easier access to and
lower cost of bank loans should make it easier for ﬁrms to access external funding, especially ﬁrms that are
highly dependent on external ﬁnancing. We perform subsample tests based on the measure of ﬁrms’ external
ﬁnance dependence developed by Duchin et al. (2010). We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on RSindex are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, even for ﬁrms with higher dependence on external ﬁnancing. In summary, we fail to ﬁnd
that interstate banking deregulation has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms’ tax avoidance behavior, even when ﬁrms
are facing ﬁnancial constraints or highly dependent on external ﬁnancing.
This study contributes to a growing stream of literature that examines the determinants of tax avoidance.
Previous studies ﬁnd very mixed results with regard to the relation between the use of debt and corporate tax
avoidance. In our paper, we use banking deregulation as a natural experiment to better identify the eﬀect of
external ﬁnancing shocks on tax avoidance behavior. Our empirical evidence fails to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant substi-
tutive relation between tax avoidance and the use of debt, even for ﬁrms with ﬁnancial constraints. Our paper
sheds light on the debate in this research ﬁeld. Our paper also contributes to the banking literature that exam-
ines the real eﬀects of banking deregulation on corporate decision-making.1 Using DealScan dataset, we examine how interstate banking deregulation aﬀects the costs and amounts of bank loans for US public
ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that bank loan spreads are signiﬁcantly reduced and bank loan amounts are signiﬁcantly increased after banking
deregulation.
2 We also perform an interaction model, interacting RSindex with the dummy variable high_KZ score. The results are consistent with the
subsample regressions.
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between cash savings from tax avoidance and external ﬁnance. Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 pre-
sents the empirical results. Section 5 provides the subsample analyses and Section 6 explores the eﬀect of
intrastate deregulation. Section 7 concludes.
2. Hypothesis development
Numerous studies focus on the eﬀects of ﬁrm-level characteristics on tax avoidance (e.g., Chen and Chu,
2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Wilson, 2009; Armstrong et al., 2012; Hoi et al., 2013). However, many
research questions remain unanswered. Maydew (2001) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggest that the the-
oretical and empirical tax research from the accounting, ﬁnance and economics ﬁelds should be integrated to
provide a more in-depth perspective on this issue. In this paper, we examine whether cash savings from tax
avoidance can be substituted for the use of debt.
Prior tax avoidance studies suggest that tax planning is not free. In fact, it can be very costly to build up
complex tax avoidance strategies (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). Similar to raising funds from external
sources, managers need to exploit unused tax strategies and consider the potential cost of cash savings from
tax planning. According to Edwards et al. (2013), the implicit discount rate of funds is determined by (1) the
amount of cash saved from tax planning, (2) the expected timing of eventual repayment (if at all), (3) potential
penalties if caught by the tax authorities and (4) the cost of designing and implementing additional tax strate-
gies. Not all of these costs apply to every tax strategy. For example, deferral strategies are similar to an
interest-free loan obtained from the government, but ﬁrms eventually need to repay them. When ﬁrms use per-
manent tax avoidance strategies, they may avoid paying back the taxes if they are not sued by the tax author-
ities, but otherwise they will pay high penalties and interest on the tax owed to the tax authorities.3
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) theoretically model the substitution between debt tax shields and non-debt
tax shields. They argue that tax deductions from tax avoidance (e.g., tax sheltering) are non-debt tax shields,
and non-debt tax shields can be substituted for tax deductions from debt interest. DeAngelo and Masulis
(1980) show that a ﬁrm has an optimal amount of total tax deductions. If a ﬁrm uses more non-debt tax
shields, it will use fewer debt tax deductions. Graham and Tucker (2006) empirically test DeAngelo and
Masulis’s (1980) theory. Using a sample of 44 tax shelter ﬁrms, Graham and Tucker (2006) ﬁnd evidence
to support the substitutive relation between tax avoidance and the use of debt. However, other studies using
larger samples ﬁnd very mixed results. For example, Edwards et al. (2013) ﬁnd that the substitutive relation
only exists for ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial constraints. Bradley et al. (1984) ﬁnd the totally opposite result that non-
debt tax shields and leverage are positively related.
Extant studies have examined the real eﬀects of banking deregulation. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) suggest
that bank deregulation signiﬁcantly increases the rates of real per capita growth in income and output. Black
and Strahan (2002) ﬁnd that deregulation spurs entrepreneurship and helps small business and new business
ﬂourish. Morgan et al. (2004) ﬁnd that the state-level business cycle is generally less volatile after the interstate
banking regulation and the associated ﬁnancial integration. A more related study by Rice and Strahan (2010)
ﬁnds that after interstate banking deregulation, small ﬁrms have a lower cost of debt and easier access to bank
loans in states that are more open to branching. Amore et al. (2013) ﬁnd that interstate bank deregulation is
associated with an 8% increase in the total net loan supply. Recent studies use bank deregulation as an exoge-
nous shock to the credit supply and examine how it aﬀects corporate decisions and outcomes (e.g., Rice and
Strahan, 2010; Amore et al., 2013; Francis et al., 2014; Cornaggia et al., 2015). Based on these studies, we
examine whether states’ openness to branching directly aﬀects ﬁrms’ tax avoidance behavior. The openness
to branching is positively correlated with lower loan costs and easier access to credit; hence, we are able to
use these staggered deregulation events to test whether cash savings from tax avoidance substitute for external
ﬁnancing.3 Andreoni (1992) models this tax avoidance behavior. This discussion does not include the costs associated with implementing tax
planning strategies. Mills et al. (1998) estimate that for every $1 invested in general tax planning, although these costs are not trivial, ﬁrms
have an average return of approximately $4.
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more likely to reduce their tax avoidance practices because they have easier access to lower cost bank loans.
We propose the following hypothesis:
H1: Tax avoidance is negatively correlated with states’ openness to branching.3. Sample and summary statistics
3.1. Sample
To investigate the eﬀect of banking deregulation on corporate tax avoidance, we obtain data from two
sources. We obtain data on interstate banking deregulation from Rice and Strahan (2010) and ﬁnancial infor-
mation from Standard & Poor’s Compustat. Following the tax avoidance literature, we exclude ﬁrms in the
utility (SIC codes 4900–4949) and ﬁnance (SIC codes 6000–6999) industries. We merge the ﬁrm data from
Compustat with the deregulation data if a ﬁrm is headquartered in the same state as the deregulation state.
After dropping missing information, we ﬁnally have 48,013 ﬁrm-year observations for 7,374 unique ﬁrms
in 50 states. Table 1 reports the sample distribution by ﬁscal year. The ﬁrm-year observations are relatively
evenly distributed from 1987 to 2010.3.2. Variables
We construct a variable named RSindex following Rice and Strahan (2010). As described in Rice and
Strahan (2010), the IBBEA allowed states to erect out-of-state entry barriers from the time of enactment in
1994 until 1 June 1997. States could use any combination of the following four provisions to set their barriers
to interstate branching: (i) a minimum age for the target institution; (ii) de novo interstate branching; (iii) theTable 1
Sample distribution.
Fiscal year Frequency Percent
1987 1983 4.13%
1988 2044 4.26%
1989 1912 3.98%
1990 1917 3.99%
1991 1864 3.88%
1992 1986 4.14%
1993 2132 4.44%
1994 2413 5.03%
1995 2450 5.10%
1996 2631 5.48%
1997 2666 5.55%
1998 2408 5.02%
1999 2326 4.84%
2000 2113 4.40%
2001 1681 3.50%
2002 1758 3.66%
2003 1845 3.84%
2004 1983 4.13%
2005 1940 4.04%
2006 1857 3.87%
2007 1744 3.63%
2008 1441 3.00%
2009 1362 2.84%
2010 1557 3.24%
Total 48,013 100%
This table presents the number and percentage of ﬁrm-year observations for the 1987 to 2010 period.
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Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variable N Mean Median STD
Panel A
Cash ETR 38,158 0.2911 0.2774 0.2358
GAAP ETR 41,482 0.3278 0.3639 0.1679
Discretionary BT 17,555 0.0379 0.0330 0.1152
DTAX 30,053 0.0027 0.0020 0.3358
Panel B
RSindex 48,013 2.7998 3.0000 1.4161
ROA 48,013 0.1175 0.0867 0.1961
Leverage 48,013 0.1903 0.1267 0.3822
Size 48,013 5.2786 5.2332 2.1512
LagMB 48,013 2.9374 2.0149 3.5309
NOL 48,013 0.2776 0.0000 0.4478
Delta_gdwill 48,013 0.0282 0.0000 0.1565
New investment 48,013 0.0738 0.0439 0.1164
Foreign asset 48,013 0.3875 0.0000 0.4872
Cash 48,013 0.1930 0.0887 0.3397
The full sample contains 48,013 ﬁrm-year observations for 7374 distinct ﬁrms from 1987 to 2010. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics
for tax avoidance measures. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for ﬁrm characteristics. Detailed deﬁnitions and measurements for
all variables can be found in the Appendix.
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sions a state sets on interstate branching. Therefore, RSindex ranges from 0 to 4. States that have an RSindex
of 0 are the most open toward branching and vice versa. 4
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) state that ‘‘if tax avoidance represents a continuum of tax planning strategies
where something like municipal bond investments are at one end, then terms such as ‘noncompliance,’ ‘eva-
sion,’ ‘aggressiveness,’ and ‘sheltering’ would be closer to the other end of the continuum.” We are interested
in all tax avoidance strategies that could reduce explicit taxes. Following studies such as Dyreng et al. (2010),
Hope et al. (2013) and Hasan et al. (2014), we use four measures to capture this continuum. Two alternate tax
rate measures, GAAP ETR and Cash ETR, are used to estimate broad tax avoidance practices (Dyreng et al.,
2010; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). GAAP ETR is the ratio of total tax expenses to pretax income for a ﬁrm in
a given year. Cash ETR is the ratio of cash tax paid to pretax income for a ﬁrm in a given year. By deﬁnition, a
higher GAAP ETR or Cash ETR value means less corporate tax avoidance.
Two measures of book-tax diﬀerence are used to capture more aggressive tax planning strategies. Book-tax
diﬀerence is a reasonable measure of more aggressive tax avoidance. For instance, Mills et al. (1998) ﬁnd that
ﬁrms with large book-tax diﬀerences are more likely to be audited by the IRS and have larger proposed audit
adjustments. Wilson (2009) ﬁnds that book-tax diﬀerences are larger for ﬁrms accused of engaging in tax shel-
ters than for a matched sample of non-accused ﬁrms. Our book-tax diﬀerence measures are (1) the Desai and
Dharmapala (2006) discretionary book-tax diﬀerence (Discretionary BT) and (2) the Frank et al. (2009) per-
manent discretionary book-tax diﬀerence (DTAX). Higher Discretionary BT or DTAX means more aggressive
tax avoidance.
Following the literature, we control for a vector of ﬁrm characteristics that may aﬀect a ﬁrm’s tax avoid-
ance practice. Variable deﬁnitions are presented in the Appendix.3.3. Summary statistics
In Table 2, Panel A reports the summary statistics of measures that capture tax avoidance practices. Due to
the data requirement when constructing these measures, the sample sizes vary from 17,555 for Discretionary4 See Rice and Strahan (2010) for a detailed discussion and information about interstate deregulation.
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extant tax literature (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2008; Hasan et al., 2014).
In Table 2, Panel B shows the summary statistics of RSindex and other control variables for the full sample.
The mean of RSindex is about 2.80 with a standard deviation of 1.41, consistent with the study by Cornaggia
et al. (2015). The statistics of the other control variables are in the range of those reported in previous studies
(e.g., Armstrong et al., 2012).4. Empirical results
4.1. Baseline regression results
Following Rice and Strahan (2010) and Cornaggia et al. (2015), we use interstate banking deregulations as
external shocks to the supply and the price of bank loans. The staggered multiple deregulation events alleviate
the problem associated with a single shock design, and exclude the possibility of some omitted factors coin-
ciding with the shock that could aﬀect the dependent variable. We estimate the following model:5 Diﬀ
contro
Please
ReseaTax Avoidance Measurefi;tg ¼ aþ b1RSindexfi;tg þ cZfi;tg þ industryfi;tg þ yeart þ Statei þ 2fi;tg ð1ÞRSindex is the key independent variable, indicating the openness of the state toward out-of-state banking
competition. Following the tax avoidance literature, we include relevant ﬁrm characteristics that may aﬀect
tax avoidance. We include the state ﬁxed eﬀect to control for omitted time-invariant state factors that might
be correlated with tax avoidance practices such as the legal environment and the strictness of the tax author-
ity.5 We also control for year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects in the model.
Table 3 presents the results for the baseline OLS regression model in Eq. (1) and the adjusted standard
errors for within-ﬁrm clustering and heteroscedasticity. The ﬁrst column represents the regression result for
Cash ETR. The estimated coeﬃcient is 0.0017 and is not statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that interstate
banking deregulation has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms’ tax avoidance practices. The coeﬃcients on the control
variables are generally consistent with previous studies.
Column 2 shows the regression results for GAAP ETR. The results are similar to those in Column 1: the
coeﬃcient on RSindex is positive, but not signiﬁcantly correlated with GAAP ETR. We present the regression
results for Discretionary BT and DTAX in Columns 3 and 4. Consistent with eﬀective tax rate-based tax avoid-
ance measures, the coeﬃcients on RSindex are not signiﬁcant, further suggesting that interstate banking dereg-
ulation has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms’ tax avoidance practices.
We further include observations for a (3,+3)-year window around interstate deregulation events and per-
form the baseline regression model. Table 4 presents the results for the (3,+3)-year window sample. We
exclude observations in the year of the interstate deregulations. Because by eliminating some potential policy
or business environment changes in the state over the long run, we can obtain a relatively clear view of how
interstate deregulation could change tax avoidance behavior. The results for Cash ETR, GAAP ETR, Discre-
tionary BT and DTAX are presented separately in Columns 1 to 4. The results in these regressions are consis-
tent with those in Table 3, indicating that there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of banking deregulation on corporate tax
avoidance.4.2. Robustness checks
In this section, we perform a series of robustness tests to ensure that our baseline regression results hold.
We discuss the purposes and results of these additional analyses below.
We use four dummy variables to represent the diﬀerent values of RSindex. For example, dummy variable
RSindex_0 equals 1 if the value of RSindex is 0; we also create RSindex_1, RSindex_3 and RSindex_4. We add
these dummy variables to the baseline model instead of using RSindex. Therefore, the group with an RSindexerent regions may have diﬀerent levels of tax enforcement. Instead of controlling for state ﬁxed eﬀects, in a robustness check we
l for region ﬁxed eﬀects and our main results hold.
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Table 3
Baseline regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ETR GAAP ETR Discretionary BT DTAX
RSindex 0.0017 0.0007 0.0003 0.0008
(0.9956) (0.7131) (0.0013) (0.0028)
ROA 0.2118*** 0.0858*** 0.0747** 0.0431
(7.4763) (5.0456) (0.0297) (0.0483)
Leverage 0.0621*** 0.0364*** 0.0441** 0.0111
(8.0785) (6.7664) (0.0159) (0.0183)
Size 0.0124*** 0.0133*** 0.0022*** 0.0112***
(12.2466) (8.2805) (0.0008) (0.0035)
LagMB 0.0032*** 0.0047*** 0.0004 0.0050***
(5.4214) (13.2120) (0.0004) (0.0007)
NOL 0.0805*** 0.0378*** 0.0115*** 0.0105
(10.7323) (12.0038) (0.0016) (0.0125)
Delta_gdwill 0.0355** 0.0111* 0.0060 0.0309
(2.6893) (1.9487) (0.0174) (0.0493)
New investment 0.0622*** 0.0029 0.1405*** 0.0138
(3.2485) (0.2394) (0.0187) (0.0415)
Foreign assets 0.0060* 0.0116*** 0.0030 0.0041
(1.8755) (4.6355) (0.0081) (0.0040)
Cash 0.0487*** 0.0631*** 0.0048 0.0321**
(4.9564) (9.7433) (0.0091) (0.0140)
Control for
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35,540 38,761 17,555 30,053
adj. R2 0.099 0.116 0.089 0.082
This table presents the regression results of the baseline model using the full sample. The dependent variable is cash eﬀective tax rates
(Cash ETR), GAAP eﬀective tax rates (GAAP ETR), discretionary book-tax diﬀerence (Discretionary BT) and discretionary permanent
diﬀerences (DTAX) in columns 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The key independent variable is RSindex, ranging from 0 to 4. All variables are
deﬁned in the Appendix. For brevity, we omit the subscripts in the table. Standard errors are in parentheses. We use OLS regressions, and
adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and within-year clustering.
* Signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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the 16 coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient on RSindex_1 is 0.023 and signiﬁcant at the 5%
level when we use Cash ETR as the dependent variable, suggesting that ﬁrms in states where RSindex equals 1
pay more eﬀective cash tax than ﬁrms in states where RSindex equals 2. The results also show that the GAAP
ETR is signiﬁcantly lower for ﬁrms in states where RSindex equals 3 than that for ﬁrms in states where RSin-
dex equals 2. Overall, we ﬁnd no other signiﬁcant diﬀerences for the other tax measures and groups.
To estimate the possibility of a nonlinear relation, we perform two nonlinear regression models using
logRSindex and sqrRSindex, separately. logRSindex equals the natural logarithm of 1 plus RSindex. Table 6
presents the regression results. Consistent with the main ﬁndings, interstate deregulation is not signiﬁcantly
correlated with tax avoidance measures. sqrRSindex equals the square of RSindex. To perform the nonlinear
model, we include both RSindex and sqrRSindex in the regressions. The results presented in Table 7 show that
the coeﬃcients on these two independent variables are not statistically signiﬁcant for the four tax avoidance
measures, consistent with the main ﬁndings.
To compare the states at the two ends of the spectrum of openness toward branching deregulation, we per-
form a test using a subsample of ﬁrms at the two extremes. More speciﬁcally, the subsample includes only
states with an RSindex value of 0 (totally open to branching) and 4 (most restrictive to branching) up to 1
June 1997. We also include ﬁrm-year observations in these states before the IBBEA eﬀective date. BranchRes-Please cite this article in press as: Francis, B.B., et al. Banking deregulation and corporate tax avoidance. China Journal of Accounting
Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.09.004
Table 4
Baseline Regression: (3,+3) window.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ETR GAAP ETR Discretionary BT DTAX
RSindex 0.0016 0.0009 0.000511 0.00332
(0.6686) (0.5925) (0.0021) (0.0040)
ROA 0.2130*** 0.0927*** 0.0530 0.00591
(5.6665) (3.4587) (0.0509) (0.0444)
Leverage 0.0580*** 0.0536*** 0.0346** 0.00627
(5.8900) (10.6479) (0.0154) (0.0201)
Size 0.0159*** 0.0197*** 0.00184* 0.00843***
(19.7406) (20.1228) (0.0010) (0.0020)
LagMB 0.0034*** 0.0059*** 0.000583 0.00366***
(4.2939) (9.8702) (0.0005) (0.0011)
NOL 0.0883*** 0.0478*** 0.0149*** 0.0314***
(12.7228) (17.3449) (0.0030) (0.0038)
Delta_gdwill 0.0276** 0.0022 0.0550 0.0113
(2.1552) (0.1552) (0.0385) (0.0297)
New investment 0.1034*** 0.0330*** 0.141*** 0.0233
(7.2861) (3.9054) (0.0270) (0.0264)
Foreign assets 0.0005 0.0102*** 0.0204** 0.00285
(0.1023) (3.6559) (0.0096) (0.0058)
Cash 0.0311** 0.0506*** 0.00198 0.0292*
(2.6852) (10.3616) (0.0117) (0.0169)
N 15,541 16,202 6,434 11,590
adj. R2 0.095 0.148 0.117 0.061
This table presents the regression results of the baseline model using the (3,+3) window sample. The dependent variable is cash eﬀective
tax rates (Cash ETR), GAAP eﬀective tax rates (GAAP ETR), discretionary book-tax diﬀerence (Discretionary BT) and discretionary
permanent diﬀerences (DTAX) in columns 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The key independent variable is RSindex, ranging from 0 to 4. All
variables are deﬁned in the Appendix. For brevity, we omit the subscripts in the table. Standard errors are in parentheses. We use OLS
regressions, and adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and within-year clustering.
* Signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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After is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the ﬁscal year of the ﬁrm observation is after 1997. We drop the
observations in the 1997 ﬁscal year to avoid contamination eﬀects. We are interested in the variable Restrict_-
After, which is an interaction term between BranchRestrict and After. This research design is similar to a stan-
dard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences method.
Table 8 presents the regression results for this diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences test. The results show that states that
are restrictive to branching consistently pay lower GAAP ETR. Discretional BT is signiﬁcantly higher after the
interstate deregulation event. For the interaction term Restrict_After, it is signiﬁcant at the 10% level when we
use DTAX as the measure of tax avoidance, but it is not signiﬁcant for the three other measures of tax avoid-
ance. The results in general suggest that there is no signiﬁcant relation between banking deregulation and tax
avoidance practices.
It is possible that diﬀerent regions may have diﬀerent levels of tax enforcement. To mitigate this regional
eﬀect, we perform a robustness check to examine whether our main results are aﬀected by region. Speciﬁcally,
following the United States Census Bureau deﬁnition, we divide states into four regions: Northeast, Midwest,
South and West. We then add region as a ﬁxed eﬀect to our baseline model. We ﬁnd that our main results are
unchanged after controlling for region. Finally, we test whether our results are driven by large states with
more observations. Speciﬁcally, we drop observations from California, the state with the largest number of
observations. We also drop observations from California, Texas and New York, the top three states in terms
of the number of observations. Our main results hold for these robustness checks, suggesting that our results
are not driven by certain large states. For brevity, the results of these robustness checks are not tabulated.Please cite this article in press as: Francis, B.B., et al. Banking deregulation and corporate tax avoidance. China Journal of Accounting
Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.09.004
Table 5
Robustness test 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ETR GAAP ETR Discretionary BT DTAX
RSindex_0 0.0039 0.0066 0.0081 0.0017
(0.0098) (0.0046) (0.0085) (0.0205)
RSindex_1 0.0230** 0.0049 0.0014 0.0088
(0.0082) (0.0048) (0.0114) (0.0157)
RSindex_3 0.0066 0.0112** 0.0002 0.0202
(0.0079) (0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0166)
RSindex_4 0.0135 0.0071 0.0052 0.0120
(0.0090) (0.0057) (0.0076) (0.0100)
ROA 0.2132*** 0.0926*** 0.0534 0.0062
(0.0374) (0.0268) (0.0361) (0.0357)
Leverage 0.0580*** 0.0536*** 0.0345*** 0.0062
(0.0099) (0.0050) (0.0071) (0.0154)
Size 0.0161*** 0.0197*** 0.0018** 0.0084***
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0019)
LagMB 0.0034*** 0.0059*** 0.0006 0.0037***
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009)
NOL 0.0882*** 0.0477*** 0.0150*** 0.0315***
(0.0069) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0050)
Delta_gdwill 0.0274** 0.0021 0.0550*** 0.0116
(0.0128) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0338)
New investment 0.1032*** 0.0332*** 0.1407*** 0.0231
(0.0139) (0.0084) (0.0186) (0.0297)
Foreign assets 0.0005 0.0101*** 0.0204** 0.0030
(0.0045) (0.0028) (0.0094) (0.0052)
Cash 0.0313** 0.0507*** 0.0021 0.0291**
(0.0117) (0.0049) (0.0104) (0.0103)
Control for
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 15,541 16,202 6,434 11,590
adj. R2 0.096 0.148 0.117 0.061
This table presents the robustness check by using alternate measures of RSindex. The dependent variable is cash eﬀective tax rates (Cash
ETR), GAAP eﬀective tax rates (GAAP ETR), discretionary book-tax diﬀerence (Discretionary BT) and discretionary Permanent Dif-
ferences (DTAX) in columns 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The key independent variables are RSindex_0 to RSindex_4. RSindex_0 is a
dummy variable where RSindex equals 0; RSindex_1, RSindex_3 and RSindex_4 equal 1, 2 and 3, respectively. In the regression, the
reference group is RSindex_2. All variables are deﬁned in the Appendix. For brevity, we omit the subscripts in the table. Standard errors
are in parentheses. We use OLS regressions, and adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and within-year clustering.
** Signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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avoidance and bank deregulation.
5. Subsample tests
As discussed earlier, although the baseline tests show no signiﬁcant results for RSindex, we assume that
ﬁrms with high ﬁnancial constraints are more likely to be aﬀected by interstate banking deregulation, because
easier access to bank loans after deregulation may relieve their ﬁnancial constraints and subsequently change
their tax avoidance practices. In this section, we examine whether companies’ ﬁnancial constraints moderate
the eﬀect of interstate deregulation on tax avoidance behavior.Please cite this article in press as: Francis, B.B., et al. Banking deregulation and corporate tax avoidance. China Journal of Accounting
Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.09.004
Table 6
Robustness test 2.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ETR GAAP ETR Discretionary BT DTAX
LogRSindex 0.0037 0.0019 0.0024 0.0088
(0.0059) (0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0121)
ROA 0.2130*** 0.0927*** 0.0531 0.0059
(0.0376) (0.0268) (0.0363) (0.0357)
Leverage 0.0580*** 0.0536*** 0.0345*** 0.0063
(0.0098) (0.0050) (0.0071) (0.0153)
Size 0.0159*** 0.0197*** 0.0018** 0.0084***
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0019)
LagMB 0.0034*** 0.0059*** 0.0006 0.0037***
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009)
NOL 0.0883*** 0.0478*** 0.0149*** 0.0315***
(0.0069) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0050)
Delta_gdwill 0.0275** 0.0022 0.0551*** 0.0113
(0.0128) (0.0144) (0.0150) (0.0337)
New investment 0.1034*** 0.0330*** 0.1406*** 0.0232
(0.0142) (0.0085) (0.0186) (0.0297)
Foreign assets 0.0005 0.0102*** 0.0204** 0.0029
(0.0045) (0.0028) (0.0094) (0.0051)
Cash 0.0311** 0.0506*** 0.0020 0.0292**
(0.0116) (0.0049) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Control for
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 15,541 16,202 6434 11,590
adj. R2 0.095 0.148 0.117 0.061
This table presents the robustness check by taking natural logarithm of RSindex. The dependent variable is cash eﬀective tax rates (Cash
ETR), GAAP eﬀective tax rates (GAAP ETR), discretionary book-tax diﬀerence (Discretionary BT) and discretionary permanent dif-
ferences (DTAX) in columns 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The key independent variable is logRSindex, which equals the natural logarithm of
(1 + RSindex).All variables are deﬁned in the Appendix. For brevity, we omit the subscripts in the table. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. We use OLS regressions, and adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and within-year clustering.
** Signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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If banking competition after interstate deregulation directly aﬀects ﬁrms’ access to bank loans, it may relax
their ﬁnancial constraints and decrease their tax avoidance practices for cash saving purposes. We use Kaplan
and Zingales’s (1997) ﬁnancial constraint index, KZscore, and divide the (3,+3)-year window sample into
ﬁve subgroups according to the value of KZscore. We deﬁne ﬁrms in the top two quintile groups as highly
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms and those in the bottom two quintile groups as low ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
The regression results for highly ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are presented in Table 9, Panel A. The coeﬃcient
on RSindex is -0.000174 and is not statistically signiﬁcant when we use Cash ETR as the dependent variable.
Similar results are found for all other three tax avoidance measures. The results suggest that bank deregulation
has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on tax avoidance practices even for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. In Panel B, we per-
form regressions for low ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, and again the coeﬃcients on RSindex are not signiﬁcant
for all tax avoidance measures. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between these two groups. Therefore, we do
not ﬁnd evidence to support the substitutive relation between tax avoidance and the use of debt, even for
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.Please cite this article in press as: Francis, B.B., et al. Banking deregulation and corporate tax avoidance. China Journal of Accounting
Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.09.004
Table 7
Robustness test 3.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ETR GAAP ETR Discretionary BT DTAX
RSindex 0.0070 0.0003 0.0081 0.0082
(0.0067) (0.0042) (0.0065) (0.0180)
sqrRSindex 0.0021 0.0001 0.0018 0.0012
(0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0036)
ROA 0.2129*** 0.0927*** 0.0534 0.0059
(0.0376) (0.0268) (0.0362) (0.0357)
Leverage 0.0580*** 0.0536*** 0.0345*** 0.0063
(0.0099) (0.0050) (0.0071) (0.0153)
Size 0.0160*** 0.0197*** 0.0019** 0.0084***
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0019)
LagMB 0.0034*** 0.0059*** 0.0006 0.0037***
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009)
NOL 0.0883*** 0.0478*** 0.0150*** 0.0315***
(0.0069) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0050)
Delta_gdwill 0.0276** 0.0022 0.0550*** 0.0114
(0.0128) (0.0143) (0.0149) (0.0338)
New investment 0.1030*** 0.0331*** 0.1407*** 0.0231
(0.0141) (0.0084) (0.0186) (0.0296)
Foreign assets 0.0004 0.0102*** 0.0204** 0.0029
(0.0045) (0.0028) (0.0094) (0.0051)
Cash_w 0.0312** 0.0506*** 0.0021 0.0292**
(0.0116) (0.0049) (0.0104) (0.0103)
N 15,541 16,202 6434 11,590
adj. R2 0.095 0.148 0.117 0.060
This table presents the robustness check by examining the nonlinear relation between RSindex and tax avoidance. The dependent variable
is cash eﬀective tax rates (Cash ETR), GAAP eﬀective tax rates (GAAP ETR), discretionary book-tax diﬀerence (Discretionary BT) and
discretionary permanent diﬀerences (DTAX) in columns 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The key independent variable is RSindex and
sqrRSindex. sqrRSindex is equal to the square of RSindex. All variables are deﬁned in the Appendix. For brevity, we omit the subscripts in
the table. Standard errors are in parentheses. We use OLS regressions, and adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and within-year
clustering.
** Signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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Our earlier tests show no signiﬁcant eﬀect of banking deregulation on tax avoidance practices, and thus do
not support the use of debt as substitutive of the cash savings from tax avoidance practices. In this subsection,
we examine whether companies that are highly dependent on external ﬁnancing sources substitute cash savings
from tax avoidance with the use of debt. We expect that ﬁrms that are highly dependent on external ﬁnance
decrease their tax avoidance, because they have easier access to credit after interstate deregulation. We use the
measure of external ﬁnance dependence developed by Duchin et al. (2010) and construct a dummy variable,
High_dependence, that equals 1 if the value of ﬁrm-year external ﬁnance dependence (EFD) is above the indus-
try median (indicating higher EFD), and 0 otherwise.
In Table 10, Panel A shows the subsample regression analysis for high EFD ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient on RSin-
dex is 0.0080 and not statistically signiﬁcant when we use Cash ETR as the dependent variable. Similar results
are found for the other three tax avoidance measures. Panel B reports the regression results for low EFD ﬁrms.
Again, the coeﬃcients on RSindex are not statistically signiﬁcant for all four tax avoidance measures. From
these tests, we cannot conclude that these two subgroups are statistically and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each
other. The results indicate that external ﬁnancing dependence does not moderate the eﬀect of interstate bank-
ing deregulation on tax avoidance practices.Please cite this article in press as: Francis, B.B., et al. Banking deregulation and corporate tax avoidance. China Journal of Accounting
Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.09.004
Table 8
Robustness test 4.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ETR GAAP ETR Discretionary BT DTAX
BranchRestrict 0.0064 0.0538** 0.0119 0.0126
(0.0519) (0.0149) (0.0193) (0.0400)
After 0.0092 0.0020 0.0254*** 0.0035
(0.0113) (0.0027) (0.0063) (0.0054)
Restrict_After 0.0069 0.0053 0.0156 0.0181*
(0.0227) (0.0039) (0.0084) (0.0072)
ROA 0.2670** 0.0440 0.1352* 0.0998
(0.0705) (0.0597) (0.0605) (0.0976)
Leverage 0.0774*** 0.0436*** 0.0008 0.0239
(0.0144) (0.0098) (0.0120) (0.0138)
Size 0.0133*** 0.0206*** 0.0017 0.0061**
(0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0021)
LagMB 0.0016 0.0046*** 0.0012 0.0032
(0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0019)
NOL 0.0705*** 0.0269*** 0.0070 0.0327***
(0.0119) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0061)
Delta_gdwill 0.0582 0.0017 0.1223* 0.0330
(0.0394) (0.0220) (0.0527) (0.0251)
New investment 0.0885* 0.0040 0.1247** 0.0557
(0.0428) (0.0169) (0.0310) (0.0350)
Foreign assets 0.0052 0.0155 0.0069 0.0143
(0.0073) (0.0080) (0.0142) (0.0133)
Cash 0.0170 0.0494*** 0.0491** 0.0348
(0.0173) (0.0114) (0.0174) (0.0379)
Control for
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3928 4118 1650 3037
adj. R2 0.109 0.151 0.141 0.053
In this regression, we only include states with RSindexeither equal to 0 (fully open to branching) or 4 (most restrictive to branching).
BranchRestrict is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the state has four barriers after1 June1997, otherwise 0. After is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the ﬁscal year is after 1997. Restrict_After is the interaction term of BranchRestrict and RSindex. The dependent variable is cash
eﬀective tax rates (Cash ETR), GAAP eﬀective tax rates (GAAP ETR), discretionary book-tax diﬀerence (Discretionary BT) and
discretionary permanent diﬀerences (DTAX) in columns 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. All variables are deﬁned in the Appendix. For brevity,
we omit the subscripts in the table. Standard errors are in parentheses. We use OLS regressions, and adjust standard errors for
heteroskedasticity and within-year clustering.
* Signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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The literature documents diﬀerent eﬀects imposed by intrastate and interstate deregulations (e.g., Chava
et al., 2013). In this section, we perform an additional test on the eﬀect of intrastate deregulation on tax avoid-
ance behavior. We assume that after intrastate deregulation, ﬁrms with severe ﬁnancial constraints may
increase their tax avoidance savings, because they may face more restrictive screening technology by banks
(Dick and Lehnert, 2010).
We report the regression results in Table 11. Panel A presents the pooled sample regression results, which
include all ﬁrm-year observations in the pre- and post-intrastate deregulation periods. The coeﬃcients on
Post_intra are not statistically signiﬁcant for all four measures of tax avoidance, suggesting that intrastate
deregulation has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms’ tax avoidance behavior. Panel B shows the regression results
for a (3,+3)-year window around intrastate deregulation events. Consistent with the pooled sample regres-Please cite this article in press as: Francis, B.B., et al. Banking deregulation and corporate tax avoidance. China Journal of Accounting
Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.09.004
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sum, we do ﬁnd no empirical evidence to support the eﬀect of intrastate deregulation on corporate tax
avoidance.Table 9
Subsample regressions 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ETR GAAP ETR Discretionary BT DTAX
Panel A: Regression for high financially constrained group
RSindex 0.000174 0.000422 0.000365 0.00696
(0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0077)
KZindex 0.00000669* 0.0000103*** 0.000000550 0.00000473
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ROA 0.236*** 0.00348 0.0359 0.0399
(0.0338) (0.0292) (0.0452) (0.0469)
Leverage 0.0292* 0.0574*** 0.0219 0.00439
(0.0152) (0.0085) (0.0140) (0.0354)
Size 0.0157*** 0.0124*** 0.00813*** 0.00872
(0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0104)
LagMB 0.00185 0.00210** 0.000949 0.00107
(0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0014)
NOL 0.0405*** 0.00169 0.00662** 0.00761
(0.0094) (0.0058) (0.0026) (0.0079)
Delta_gdwill 0.0491** 0.00732 0.0964*** 0.0315
(0.0182) (0.0117) (0.0307) (0.0547)
New investment 0.0192 0.00161 0.129*** 0.106
(0.0210) (0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0729)
Foreign assets 0.00483 0.00735* 0.0139 0.00288
(0.0061) (0.0038) (0.0277) (0.0137)
Cash 0.0258 0.0211* 0.0154 0.0103
(0.0241) (0.0116) (0.0175) (0.0219)
N 5447 5527 3514 4511
adj. R2 0.097 0.109 0.179 0.085
Panel B: Regression for low financially constrained group
RSindex 0.00784* 0.000302 0.00142 0.000642
(0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0047) (0.0037)
KZindex 0.000902*** 0.0000565 0.00106* 0.000116
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0003)
ROA 0.180*** 0.146*** 0.133** 0.0662
(0.0482) (0.0275) (0.0570) (0.0486)
Leverage 0.0539** 0.0357*** 0.0237 0.0167
(0.0208) (0.0097) (0.0304) (0.0138)
Size 0.0525*** 0.0367*** 0.00491 0.0194***
(0.0047) (0.0032) (0.0078) (0.0045)
LagMB 0.00591*** 0.00888*** 0.000850 0.00680***
(0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0021)
NOL 0.120*** 0.0788*** 0.0217** 0.0487***
(0.0074) (0.0049) (0.0083) (0.0085)
Delta_gdwill 0.00628 0.0115 0.0790* 0.0170
(0.0140) (0.0289) (0.0414) (0.0726)
New investment 0.0953*** 0.0370** 0.0684* 0.00817
(0.0170) (0.0162) (0.0365) (0.0519)
Foreign assets 0.00702 0.0176*** 0.0407 0.00999
(0.0089) (0.0035) (0.0246) (0.0099)
Cash 0.0574*** 0.0833*** 0.0230 0.0456**
(0.0136) (0.0114) (0.0224) (0.0182)
(continued on next page)
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Table 10
Subsample regressions 2.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ETR GAAP ETR Discretionary BT DTAX
Panel A: Regression for high EFD group
RSindex 0.0080 0.0014 0.0002 0.0000
(0.0060) (0.0034) (0.0040) (0.0028)
ROA 0.5272*** 0.0088 0.2207* 0.0040
(0.0776) (0.0497) (0.1119) (0.0468)
Leverage 0.0930*** 0.0423** 0.0128 0.0220
(0.0236) (0.0190) (0.0250) (0.0130)
Size 0.0119*** 0.0190*** 0.0007 0.0070**
(0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0047) (0.0029)
LagMB 0.0032* 0.0045*** 0.0029 0.0058
(0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0038) (0.0036)
NOL 0.0858*** 0.0368*** 0.0129 0.0290***
(0.0133) (0.0065) (0.0114) (0.0080)
Delta_gdwill 0.0716** 0.0015 0.2181** 0.0157
(0.0273) (0.0150) (0.0843) (0.0122)
New investment 0.0527 0.0337 0.0976 0.0197
(0.0461) (0.0269) (0.0846) (0.0609)
Foreign assets 0.0064 0.0201*** 0.0137 0.0054
(0.0085) (0.0066) (0.0221) (0.0073)
Cash 0.0516** 0.0525*** 0.0722 0.0028
(0.0209) (0.0131) (0.0455) (0.0248)
N 3087 3250 874 2155
adj. R2 0.137 0.119 0.163 0.031
Panel B: Regression for low EFD group
RSindex 0.0006 0.0003 0.0029 0.0051
(0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0055)
ROA 0.1099*** 0.1055*** 0.0217 0.0308
(0.0373) (0.0274) (0.0498) (0.0393)
Leverage 0.0545*** 0.0464*** 0.0488*** 0.0011
(0.0125) (0.0076) (0.0102) (0.0251)
Size 0.0178*** 0.0203*** 0.0010 0.0092***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0023)
LagMB 0.0050*** 0.0059*** 0.0000 0.0038***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0009)
NOL 0.0885*** 0.0483*** 0.0181*** 0.0316***
(0.0059) (0.0039) (0.0032) (0.0059)
(continued on next page)
Table 9 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ETR GAAP ETR Discretionary BT DTAX
N 6201 6674 1290 4232
adj. R2 0.121 0.184 0.111 0.059
This table presents the regression results of the baseline model using subsample tests. We follow Kaplan and Zingles’s (1997) ﬁnancial
constraints index (KZindex). We divide the (3,+3) window sample into high- and low- ﬁnancially constrained groups, and perform the
baseline model regression separately. The dependent variable is cash eﬀective tax rates (Cash ETR), GAAP eﬀective tax rates (GAAP
ETR), discretionary book-tax diﬀerence (Discretionary BT) and discretionary permanent diﬀerences (DTAX) in columns 1, 2, 3 and 4,
respectively. The key independent variable is RSindex, ranging from 0 to 4. All variables are deﬁned in the Appendix. For brevity, we omit
the subscripts in the table. Standard errors are in parentheses. We use OLS regressions, and adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity
and within-year clustering.
* Signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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Table 11
Intrastate deregulation regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ETR_ GAAP ETR Discretionary BT DTAX
Panel A: Full sample regression
Post_intra 0.0159 0.0133 0.0050 0.0105
(0.0167) (0.0101) (0.0060) (0.0240)
ROA 0.4744*** 0.0038 0.0691*** 0.0248
(0.0291) (0.0201) (0.0128) (0.0558)
Leverage 0.0699*** 0.0596*** 0.0444*** 0.0396
(0.0135) (0.0093) (0.0058) (0.0256)
Size 0.0067*** 0.0064*** 0.0022*** 0.0042*
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0022)
LagMB 0.0010 0.0032*** 0.0001 0.0054***
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0014)
NOL 0.0508*** 0.0177*** 0.0102*** 0.0138
(0.0046) (0.0033) (0.0020) (0.0090)
Delta_gdwill 0.0734*** 0.0432*** 0.0036 0.0515
(0.0215) (0.0152) (0.0093) (0.0395)
New investment 0.0248 0.0628*** 0.1493*** 0.0620
(0.0257) (0.0178) (0.0110) (0.0491)
Foreign assets 0.0146 0.0034 0.0013 0.0341
(0.0160) (0.0108) (0.0071) (0.0282)
Cash 0.0574*** 0.0707*** 0.0260*** 0.0357
(0.0131) (0.0090) (0.0058) (0.0263)
Control for
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10,909 11,462 13,540 8738
adj. R2 0.085 0.082 0.103 0.109
(continued on next page)
Table 10 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ETR GAAP ETR Discretionary BT DTAX
Delta_gdwill 0.0082 0.0072 0.0355** 0.0331
(0.0162) (0.0134) (0.0146) (0.0493)
New investment 0.1333*** 0.0327 0.1846*** 0.0547
(0.0218) (0.0203) (0.0189) (0.0415)
Foreign assets 0.0016 0.0088** 0.0326*** 0.0043
(0.0065) (0.0031) (0.0089) (0.0081)
Cash 0.0364** 0.0440*** 0.0104 0.0409**
(0.0144) (0.0074) (0.0076) (0.0182)
N 10,009 11,770 3792 7296
adj. R2 0.096 0.156 0.115 0.084
This table presents the regression results of the baseline model using subsample tests. We follow Duchin et al.’s (2010) external ﬁnance
dependence (EFD) measure. If the ﬁrm-year EFD is 3-digits below the SIC median EFD, it is considered less dependent on external
ﬁnance. We divide the (3,+3) window sample into high- and low- EFD groups, and perform the baseline model regression separately.
The dependent variable is cash eﬀective tax rates (Cash ETR), GAAP eﬀective tax rates (GAAP ETR), discretionary book-tax diﬀerence
(Discretionary BT) and discretionary permanent diﬀerences (DTAX) in columns 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The key independent variable is
RSindex, ranging from 0 to 4. All variables are deﬁned in the Appendix. For brevity, we omit the subscripts in the table. Standard errors
are in parentheses. We use OLS regressions, and adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and within-year clustering.
* Signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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Table 11 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash ETR_ GAAP ETR Discretionary BT DTAX
Panel B: (3,+3) window sample regression
Post_intra 0.0191 0.0041 0.0124 0.0081
(0.0215) (0.0143) (0.0160) (0.0073)
ROA 0.3571*** 0.0850* 0.1629 0.0434
(0.0593) (0.0482) (0.2724) (0.0443)
Leverage 0.0565 0.0534* 0.0976*** 0.0001
(0.0372) (0.0304) (0.0289) (0.0094)
Size 0.0191*** 0.0080*** 0.0062** 0.0032*
(0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0016)
LagMB 0.0012 0.0051*** 0.0057 0.0014
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0049) (0.0011)
NOL 0.1385*** 0.0531*** 0.0195** 0.0146***
(0.0097) (0.0153) (0.0066) (0.0041)
Delta_gdwill 0.1837*** 0.0248 0.0659 0.0171
(0.0333) (0.0253) (0.0671) (0.0111)
New investment 0.0369 0.0208 0.2074*** 0.0153
(0.0340) (0.0305) (0.0694) (0.0284)
Foreign assets 0.0090 0.0415*** 0.0210 0.0070*
(0.0141) (0.0054) (0.0477) (0.0036)
Cash 0.0339 0.0453*** 0.0465 0.0112
(0.0270) (0.0126) (0.0432) (0.0189)
Control for
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2043 2457 1004 2143
adj. R2 0.157 0.156 0.114 0.018
This table presents the regression results for intrastate deregulation. The key independent variable is Post_intra, a dummy variable that
equals 1 when the ﬁscal year is after the state’s intrastate deregulation event. All variables are deﬁned in the Appendix. For brevity, we
omit the subscripts in the table. Panel A shows the results for the intrastate deregulation tests including all ﬁrm-year observations. Panel B
reports the results for intrastate deregulation tests including ﬁrm-year observation within a (3,+3) year window around intrastate
deregulation events. Standard errors are in parentheses. We use OLS regressions, and adjust standard errors for heteroscedasticity and
within-year clustering.
* Signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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This paper examines the substitutive relation between tax avoidance practices and the use of debt. We use
interstate banking deregulations as external shocks to the supply and the price of credit. In states that are more
open toward branching, ﬁrms are more likely to enjoy lower loan costs and easier access to credit. If the sub-
stitutive relation holds, those ﬁrms in open states should make more use of debt and consequently engage in
less tax avoidance. However, we do not ﬁnd empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. Further, we ﬁnd
that ﬁrms do not signiﬁcantly change their tax avoidance behavior when they relax their ﬁnancial constraints.
This study contributes to the current debate on whether a substitutive relation exists between tax avoidance
savings and the use of external ﬁnancing. This paper also helps to understand the real eﬀect of banking dereg-
ulation on the real economy.
Although we do not observe a signiﬁcant eﬀect of bank deregulation on corporate tax avoidance, we are
cautious in drawing the conclusion that there is no substitutive relation between corporate tax avoidance
and the use of debt. It is possible that such an eﬀect may indeed exist, but we are simply unable to ﬁnd it
empirically due to some limitations and caveats in our study. First, our four measures of tax avoidance in gen-Please cite this article in press as: Francis, B.B., et al. Banking deregulation and corporate tax avoidance. China Journal of Accounting
Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.09.004
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between the use of debt and certain types of tax avoidance strategies, which are not directly measured in
our study. Second, Graham and Tucker (2006) ﬁnd a substitutive relation between the usage of debt and more
aggressive tax avoidance such as tax sheltering, while our four measures capture more broad tax avoidance.
Third, another potential explanation for our main results is that tax avoidance behavior is permanent or not
reversible. When ﬁrms are facing ﬁnancial constraints or are unable to meet their capital demand, they might
exploit unused tax planning strategies and save cash for their capital demand. However, whether they reverse
their tax avoidance strategies when their ﬁnancial constraints relax is unknown. If tax avoidance strategies are
permanent or irreversible, it is not surprising that we do not observe a signiﬁcant change after banking dereg-
ulation. Fourth, although our research design is based on interstate banking deregulation as an external
shock, our results could still be biased by some ﬁrm-level or region-level omitted variables.
Appendix A. Variable definitionsVariablePlease cite this artic
Research (2016), httDeﬁnitionRSindex Rice-Strahan index of inter-state banking deregulation based on Rice and Strahan (2010). It
ranges from 0 (deregulated) to 4 (highly regulated) based on a state’s regulation changesCETR The cash eﬀective tax rate for the year, deﬁned as total income taxes paid (TXPD) scaled by
the total of pre-tax income (PI) minus minority interest (MII)GAAP ETR The GAAP eﬀective tax rate for the year deﬁned as total income-tax expenses (TXT) scaled
by pre-tax income (PI)Discretionary
BTDiscretionary BT builds on the BT measure proposed by Manzon and Plesko (2002)DTAX Modiﬁed discretionary permanent diﬀerences and ETR diﬀerentials as deﬁned in Frank et al.
(2009)ControlsLag M/B Market capitalization (CSHO*PRCC_F) over the book value of total shareholders’ equity
(AT-LT) at the beginning of the yearDelta_gdwill The annual change in good will if greater than 0; otherwise 0
ROA Net income(or loss) (NI) scaled by beginning of the year total assets (AT)
Leverage Long-term debt (LT) over total assets (AT)
Size Natural logarithm of the market value of equity (PRCC_F 3 CSHO) for ﬁrms at the
beginning of year
NOL A dummy variable that equals 1 if the loss carried forward (TLCF) for the ﬁrm is positive at
the beginning of the year
Cash Cash holding for ﬁrm i, year t, deﬁned as cash and marketable securities (CHE) divided by
lagged assets (AT)
Foreign assets Foreign income (PIFO) for ﬁrm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets (AT). Missing values in
PIFO are set to 0References
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